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MILIARY AFFAIRS - VETERANS' PREFERENCE ACT - STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION - The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held
that honorably discharged veterans of the United States Reserves
or National Guard are eligible for employment preference in public
positions only when they fulfill their complete military obligations.
Sicuro v. City of Pittsburgh, 684 A.2d 232 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
After issuing a December 1993 public announcement and
conducting civil service examinations, the City of Pittsburgh, on
July 2, 1994, posted' a listing of candidates eligible for entry-level
firefighter appointments. 2  Inclusion on this eligibility list, a
ranked-by-score enumeration of candidates who successfully
completed the examinations, represented the sole vehicle for its
members to achieve permanent appointments as City of Pittsburgh
firefighters.3 The law strictly prescribes the City's method of
making firefighter appointments: it must select the candidate who
attained the highest rank on the list, bypassing him/her only for
cause.4 Hence, a candidate's likelihood of attaining a firefighter
1. "Posting" is the act of making information accessible to the public by its
conspicuous display. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1167 (6th ed. 1990). Pittsburgh must post the
names and scores of all applicants who passed eligibility tests for competitively awarded
positions. General Civil Service Act, 53 PA. CON. STAT. § 23441 (1907).
2. Sicuro v. City of Pittsburgh, 684 A.2d 232, 233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). As a
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania city of the second class, Pittsburgh must appoint firefighters
in accordance with the provisions of the Firemen's Civil Service Statute, codified at 53 PA.
CON. STAT. §§ 23491-23498 (1939). The City's firefighter hiring protocols are also governed by
the provisions of the General Civil Service Act, 53 PA. CON. STAT. §§ 23431-23462 (1907), when
those provisions are not in conflict with the Firemen's Civil Service Statute. See Civil Serv.
Comm'n, City of Pittsburgh v. Paieski, 559 A.2d 121, 125-126 (Pa. Cominmw. Ct. 1989) (The
City may not rely on provisions of the General Civil Service Act when a provision of the
Policemen's Civil Service Statute (codified at 53 PA. CON. STAT. §§ 23531-23540 (1951))
addresses the specific matter.).
3. 53 PA. CON. STAT. § 23493.1 (1939). Pittsburgh has no authority to prescribe rules
resulting in an alternate method of firefighter appointment. Id. at § 23492. The General Civil
Service Act allows the City to appoint firefighters without the use of an eligibility list only
during a time of crisis and only for a period not to exceed three months. 53 PA. CON. STAT.
§§ 23447, 23448 (1907).
4. 53 PA. CON. STAT. § 23493.1 (1939). Although the Firemen's Civil Service Statute does
not define "cause," the General Civil Service Act empowers the Civil Service Commission to
refuse certification to a candidate determined unfit because of inappropriate qualifications,
physical inability to perform necessary job duties, addiction to drugs or alcohol, criminal
conviction, participation in "infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct," previous
non-economic discharge from government employment, or application fraud. 53 PA. CON.
STAT. § 23442 (1907).
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appointment is directly related to his/her position on the eligibility
list.
As a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Pittsburgh ("City") must apply the Veterans' Preference Act, (the
"Act"), to qualified veterans who seek its competitively-awarded
positions.5 The Act compels Pittsburgh to add a ten-point bonus
(the "Bonus") to an honorably discharged soldier's6  raw
examination score after that soldier achieves a passing examination
mark.7 Adhering to its interpretation of the Act, the City augmented
each soldier candidate's examination score with the Bonus, thereby
improving each soldier candidate's list position and, as a result, his/
her chance of receiving a firefighter appointment.
8
Ralph Sicuro and five other candidates (collectively "Sicuro"),
successfully completed City civil service firefighter examinations.9
Each validated his soldier's status before the list's posting by
presenting the City with proof of honorable discharge and, as a
result, received the Bonus on the posting date.10 All six soldier
candidates had achieved raw examination scores of 94%; thus, the
addition of the Bonus improved their eligibility list scores to 104%
and positions on the list to between 35 and 60."
5. Veterans' Preference Act, 51 P& CON. STAT. §§ 7101-7109 (1975). The Act applies to
the Commonwealth's and its political subdivisions' public positions (§ 7103) and is the
exclusive method for Pittsburgh's awarding employment preference for military service. Id.
at § 7109.
6. 51 PA. CON. STAT. § 7101 (1975). The Act defines a "soldier" as one who during a
time of armed conflict served in either the United States armed forces or an associated
women's group, or as one who since July 27, 1953 served or later serves in such a unit. Id.
at § 7101 (1975). In all cases, the individual must have been honorably discharged from the
service to receive the ten-point veterans' preference. Id. See Opinion of the Attorney
General, 1978 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 5 (veteran must have attained an honorable discharge from
military service prior to enjoying the Act's preferences).
7. 51 PA. CON. STAT. § 7103 (1975). The Act requires the soldier to be qualified for the
applied-for position prior to earning the Bonus. See Brickhouse v. Spring Ford Area Sch.
Dist., 656 A.2d 480 (Pa- 1995) (veteran meeting minimum position qualifications is not
entitled to automatic appointment when the hiring authority reasonably requires higher than
minimum qualifications). See also City of Pittsburgh, Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Weger, 505 A.2d
398 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (public position's pre-employment requirements are valid so long
as they are not arbitrarily determined); Eggleston v. City of Philadelphia, 110 A.2d 183 (Pa.
1955) (veteran must satisfy a position's qualifications in order to receive appointment
preference).
8. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 233, 234.
9. Id. at 234.
10. Id. By December 27, 1993 (the application deadline), Sicuro validated his soldier's
status by submitting his form DD-214, a Department of Defense official statement of military
service that identifies, among other things, the dates served and type of discharged attained.
Record at 54.
11. Sicuro v. City of Pittsburgh, No. GD 95-12924 (C.R Ct. Allegheny County, Nov. 2,
1998 Sicuro
Sicuro brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County seeking a declaratory judgment12 concerning two
of the City's veterans' preference award policies. 13 First, he
contended that the City's practice of allowing an applicant to
submit official military separation and discharge papers at any time
and still be eligible for the veterans' preference (even if the
submission occurred after the list's posting date) violated the Act's
requirement of fixing a veteran applicant's Bonus eligibility at the
time of the civil service examination.14 Second, and the main thrust
of the action, Sicuro contested the City's practice of awarding
veterans' preference to candidates who completed and received
honorable discharges from only three to four months of active duty
Reserve or National Guard (collectively "Reserve"), training but
who remained obligated to part-time Reserve duty. 5 Sicuro argued
that candidates with a mere three to four months of active service
and an ongoing military commitment met neither the Act's
definition of "soldier" nor its intent. He further argued that the
value of such military service is not reasonably related to the Act's
purpose.
16
At trial, the City's Motion to Join Indispensable Parties 7
identified fourteen candidates (collectively "Appellants") who held
current Reserve commitments but received the Bonus as a result of
1995) at Appendix A.
12. A "declaratory judgment" is appropriate when two antagonistic parties present an
issue promising inevitable litigation, which results in the court's expressing the rights of
individual parties. PENNSYLVANIA LAw ENCYCLOPEDIA 368, 373 (1970).
13. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 1.
14. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 234. The City's actual practice contradicted its stated policy as
listed on its firefighter recruitment public announcement, because the City accepted
discharge and separation papers after the application deadline. Record at 27. The policy's
pertinent wording is as follows: "Veterans' preference points will be awarded to eligible
candidates who achieve a Final passing score. Your, or your spouse's (if deceased or
disabled) original discharge and separation papers (DD-214) must be received by the
Department of Personnel and Civil Service Commission at the time of filing application."
Appellants' Brief at 6, Sicuro v. City of Pittsburgh, 684 A.2d 232 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)
(emphasis in original). This contradiction, however, was not an issue before the court.
15. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 234. For example, the City awarded veterans' preference to a
candidate who committed to Reserve duty for a term of eight years, with the first three
months of that commitment devoted to full-time active training and the remainder requiring
service of one weekend per month and two weeks per year. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 4.
The City's practice awarded the veterans' preference at the end of the three month training
regardless of the candidate's remaining service term. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 4.
16. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 234.
17. "Indispensable parties" are those who must be joined to an action because, given
their interest in the matter, no judicial determination can be adequate without their
participation or awareness. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 773 (6th ed. 1990).
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their three to four months of military training.'8 Appellants' records
of Reserve service are summarized as follows: two enlisted after
the civil service examinations but prior to the list's posting; twelve
enlisted after the list's posting; none received an honorable
discharge prior to the list's posting; and all had continuing military
commitments at the point of receiving the veterans' preference. 9
As there existed no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court
considered each party's Motion for Summary Judgment. 20 The trial
court granted Sicuro's motion and denied the City's. 21 In doing so,
the trial court held that Reservists and National Guard members
(collectively "Reservists") are not eligible for veterans' preference
until they have completed their minimum obligations to their
respective military branches.22 Further, the opinion, but not the
order, concluded that candidates whose minimum military
obligations end after the list's posting, but prior to the list's
expiration, should be awarded the Bonus.23 For example, firefighter
candidates could submit military separation and discharge papers
18. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 2. Without the Bonus, the Appellants' ranking would
have been from 168 to 590; with the Bonus, their rankings increased from 4 to 144. Record
at 129. With the Bonus, five appellants were to be appointed (absent cause) before the
Appellees. Id. at 128-129. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 234.
20. Id. "Summary judgment" is a pre-trial request to the court that, when granted,
results in a judicial determination without an actual trial; it is appropriate only when both
parties agree to the matter's material facts and do not differ as to inferences that spring from
those facts. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1435 (6th ed. 1990). Either or both parties may move for
summary judgment after the closing of the pleadings, but the timing of the motion must not
be such that it delays the trial. PA- R. CT. 68 (revised ed. 1995).
21. Sicuro, 684 A-2d at 234. The trial court judge had recently issued an Opinion and
Order in a City of Pittsburgh veterans' preference matter, holding that the veterans'
preference provision regarding promotional examinations, regardless of the Act's clear
language, violates the prohibition against special privileges in Article 1, § 17 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge
No. 1, No. GD 94-017598 (C.P. Ct. Allegheny County, Nov. 9, 1994). In arriving at this holding,
the court relied on many of the cases utilized in the Sicuro opinion. Id. at 4-14. See Graham
v. Schmaid, 2 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1938); Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951); Brickhouse v.
Spring Ford Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 711 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1993), overruled by 656 A.2d 480 (Pa.
1995); Eggleston v. City of Philadelphia, 110 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1955). See also Williams v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 300 A.2d 799 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (holding that the Bonus is reasonably
related to effective entry-level public service and is, therefore, constitutional); Northeastern
Educ. Intermediate Unit v. Stephens, 510 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding that
military time counts toward seniority for furlough purposes); Taxpayers v. Carbondale, 553
A.2d 119 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (holding that veteran must be qualified prior to receiving
the Bonus); Carter v. Philadelphia, 989 F2d 117 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a veteran's right
to statutory promotional preference is constitutionally protected as long as the veteran is
qualified).
22. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 234, 235.
23. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 9.
Sicuro
after the examination date and still receive the Bonus.24
To reach its conclusion, the court analyzed Herskovitz v. State
Civil Svc. Comm'n, a case upon which both parties placed great
reliance. 25 In Herskovitz, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
held that honorably discharged Reservists satisfy the Act's
definition of "soldier," and are, therefore, eligible for the Bonus as
a result of their military training and service.26 The City interpreted
this holding as extending Bonus eligibility to Reservists who had
completed their military training commitment.27 Sicuro argued that
because each Herskovitz petitioner had completed his training and
part-time service obligation, the Herskovitz court intended
Reservists to be Bonus-eligible only upon their full separation from
the Reserves.
28
The Sicuro trial court distinguished the Herskovitz petitioners
from the fourteen Reservists in Sicuro.29 Noting, that Herskovitz
defined "training time and service," and its Petitioners fully
completed such training time and service, the court concluded that
attaining the "soldier" distinction is not a function of one's merely
completing training but of his/her completing the full service
obligation.
30
The trial court found further grounds to rule against the City's
practice in the holdings of Graham v. Schmid31 and Maurer v.
O'Neill.32 In Schmid, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania formulated
the test by which veterans' preference provisions are to be
constitutionally judged: when the preference is reasonably related
to the object sought (proper discharge of government duties), the
provision is constitutionally valid; but when it has no such
reasonable relationship, the provision is arbitrary and
24. Id. Competitive eligibility lists generated as a result of the City's Civil Service
examination are valid for not less than one year but not greater than three years. 53 PA CON.
STAT. § 23445 (1907).
25. Sicuro, 684 A-2d at 235 (citing Herskovitz v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 534 A.2d 160
(Pa- Conunw. Ct. 1987)). See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
26. Herskovitz, 534 A.2d at 161-62.
27. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 235-36. See Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 9-10.
28. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 236.
29. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 11.
30. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Herskovitz v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 534 A.2d 160 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987)).
31. Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1938). See intfra notes 56-67 and accompanying
text.
32. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951). See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying
1998
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constitutionally offensive.33 Thirteen years later, the supreme court
in O'Nei// upheld the Schmid test as the touchstone of veterans'
preference constitutionality 3
Noting that Schmid and O'Neill represent the current state of the
law concerning the Act's constitutionality, the Sicuro trial court
applied these holdings and concluded that awarding veterans'
preference in return for three to four months of military training
"places too high a value on this military training."35 The trial court
found the City's practice eliminates the Act's purpose of
distinguishing veterans and ruled that one must complete his/her
full Reserve or National Guard obligation of training and service to
receive the preference.
36
Now stripped of their veterans' preference points, the Appellants
appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, contending
that the trial court either abused its discretion or committed an
error or law.37 Applying the trial court's reasoning and citing other
grounds, the commonwealth court affirmed.3
The commonwealth court reviewed the Herskovitz petitioners'
military service records and, as did the court below, distinguished
those Petitioners from the Appellants in the present case based on
training time and full service obligation.3 9  Through strict
construction, 4° the court interpreted the Act according to its plain
meaning and found a duty to invalidate applications not consistent
with its language.41 Analyzing the Act's definition of "soldier," the
33. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704.
34. O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 383.
35. Sicuro, No. GD '95-12924 at 14-16. The court noted Schmid's precedential
prominence by citing it as "the landmark case" in veterans' preference in the recent Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Brickhouse, 656 k2d 480 (Pa- 1995) (veteran meeting
minimum position qualifications is not entitled to automatic appointment when the hiring
authority reasonably requires higher than minimum qualifications).
36. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 19.
37. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 235. Judge Flaherty wrote the opinion in which Judge Kelley
and Senior Judge Rodgers joined. The commonwealth court cited Salerno v. LaBarr, 632
A.2d 1002 (Pa. Connw. Ct. 1993) as authority for its holding that the standard of review of a
trial court's grant of summary judgment is limited to abuse of discretion or error of law.
Sicuroi 684 A.2d at 235.
38. Id. at 237.
39. Id. at 236.
40. "Strict construction" is a method of statutory interpretation requiring the reviewer
to analyze a law according to the fair meaning of its words and without inserting a different
meaning to bring about an equitable solution. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990).
Strict construction is codified in Pennsylvania under the Statutory Construction Act, 1 PA
CON. STAT. § 1921 (1975). See infra note 82 for the full text of this act.
41. Id. at 237 (citing Eggleston v. City of Philadelphia, 110 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1955)
(holding that the Act of 1945 applies to candidates seeking appointment as unskilled
676 Vol. 36:671
court noted that the legislated requirement is that veterans'
preference eligibility is tied to one's honorable discharge from
armed forces service.42 The court, applying a plain meaning
standard, concluded that "service" is defined as completion of the
full Reserve commitment, not merely the active duty training
associated with those branches.4 Holding otherwise, the court
found, would result in awarding the Bonus to those only beginning
their military tenures, when the language of the Act contemplates
rewarding those who have fulfilled their obligations, a result the
court deemed inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the Act. 4
The Sicuro court inserted its conclusion that the legislature
intended veterans' preference to apply only to those without
continuing military obligations into the Schmid test.4 Schmid
requires a reasonable relationship between the preference (as a
reward for military service) and its goal (effective government
functioning). Because current Reservists have yet to fulfill their
military commitments, the court deduced that no such relationship
exists.4 This failure of the reasonable relationship test
characterized active military service members' receipt of veterans'
preference as violative of public policy and provided the grounds
for the court to strike down the practice.
47
In facing the final issue of whether a veteran achieving "soldier"
status after the examination is entitled to the Bonus, the Sicuro
court broke ranks with the trial court by answering in the
laborers). The Egglestoum court cited its authority for strictly construing a veterans'
preference act as Preferential Treatment For War Veterans No.3, 45 D. & C. 311, 315 (1945)
(The Commonwealth Attorney General's office provided the State Civil Service Commission
with a legal opinion concerning the Veterans' Preference Act of August 5, 1941, Pub. L. No.
872, advising that the 1941 Act applies to appointments to the Civil Service Commission's
personnel director, the hiring authority may choose either veteran when two are under
appointment consideration, the hiring authority may appoint an eligibility list's low-placed
veteran when no veteran is ranked among the top three list members, and the preference
applies to provisional appointment.).




46. Id. The court stated that a reward-for-military-service justified award of the Bonus.
Id. The latter half of the statute cited the "discipline and experience represented by his
military training and for the loyalty and public spirit demonstrated by his service for the
preservation of his country." 51 PA. CON. STAT. § 7102 (1975). The court noted that Schmid
and O'Ne/ remain the proper precedents for veterans' preference analysis because they had
been upheld in Hoffman v. Whitehall, 677 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 1996) (holding that the veterans'
preference, as applied to promotional exams, provides an unreasonable assessment of the
worth of military experience and is, therefore, unconstitutional).
47. Sicuro, 684 A-2d at 236 (citing Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704 (Pa. 1938)).
1998 Sicuro
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negative.48 Again seeking the legislature's intent by applying the
letter of the statute's words, the court identified three Act
provisions that clearly set the Bonus award at the time of the
examination and not beyond.49 In light of the three separate
references, the court viewed a post-examination Bonus award as an
expansion of the Act, a result it refused to condone.50
Through statutes dating back to at least 1887, Pennsylvania has
long granted preference to military veterans seeking public
employment.5' Application of veterans' preference has resulted in a
variety of challenges, including the constitutionality of preference
for promotion candidates,52 the adverse impact on a non-veteran's
ability to secure public employment,53 the relationship between the
preference and collective bargaining appointment provisions,54 and
48. Id. at 237.
49. Id. at 236-37. The court cited the following Act provisions as fixing the Bonus
award at the time of the examination: "When any soldier shall take any civil service
appointment . . . examination .. . he shall be given credit in the manner hereinafter
provided," 51 PA- CON. STAT. § 7102(a) (1975); "No soldier taking any civil service . . .
examination shall be required to furnish. . . his former rank or service serial number," 51
PA CON. STAT. § 7102(b) (1975); and "Whenever a soldier shall successfully pass a civil
service appointment . . . examination . . . such soldier's examination shall be marked or
graded an additional ten points above the mark or grade credited for the examination." 51
PA- CON. STAT. § 7103(a) (1975).
50. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 237.
51. The Act of May 19, 1887, Pub. L. No. 132 provided preference for public positions
to Civil War veterans who demonstrated compliance with the position's qualifications.
52. See Hoffman v. Township of Whitehall, 677 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 1996). The Hoffman
court reviewed a police detective's contention that the Act compelled the township to add a
ten-point preference to his lieutenant promotional examination score. Hoffman, 677 A.2d at
1201. Upholding O'Neill, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the promotional
preference provision of the Act was an unreasonable assessment of the value of military
service and, therefore, arbitrary. Hoffman, 677 A.2d at 1203. See Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A-2d
382 (Pa. 1951); City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, GD No. 94-017598 (C.P Ct.
Allegheny County, Nov. 9, 1994).
53. See Feinermann v. Jones, 356 F Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973). In Feinermann, a
female with the highest score on the Department of Education's Information Writer II civil
service examination was not appointed because the Bonus.propelled five other candidates to
higher final scores. Feinermann, 356 F. Supp. at 256-57. The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania rejected the argument that public employment is a
fundamental right or interest, upholding veterans' preference by 'the less stringent rational
basis test - that the preference was reasonably related to a permissible legislative purpose.
Id. at 258-59. The Feinermann court also held that the justifications for veterans' preference
- recognition for experience, discipline, and loyalty; reward for military service; and
rehabilitation assistance - defeat a charge of practical discrimination against females. Id. at
262. See also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts
law preferring veterans in state civil service employment was not implemented with a
discriminatory purpose against females because any person, including a female, could enjoy
its benefit. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
54. See Belle Vernon Sch. Dist. v. Teamsters, 670 A2d 1201, 1204 (Pa. Commnw. Ct.
1998 Sicuro
the absolute nature of the preferencehi Pennsylvania courts
adjudicated each matter by analyzing the issue within the Schmid
and O'Neill framework.
Schmid involved the City of Erie's refusal to apply veterans'.
preference provisions providing: (1) a fifteen percent bonus prior to
the grading of their examinations and (2) mandatory appointment
to the applied-for position when competing with non-veterans. 6 The
results of an Erie examination for assistant building inspector
positions placed a non-veteran highest on the eligibility list.5 7 Had
the City complied with the fifteen percent bonus, two veterans
would have attained scores high enough for appointment
consideration, and the mandatory appointment provision would
have compelled the City to select one of the veterans instead of the
higher-scoring non-veteran.58
Erie argued that mandatory veteran appointments created a
special class in violation of the then Article III, § 7 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibited laws granting an
individual special or executive privileges or immunities.59 The court
compared this contention against the holdings of other
jurisdictions, concluding that forming reasonable classifications
falls within the legislature's constitutionally-granted power, while
forming arbitrary ones is constitutionally prohibited.6° Hence, so
1996) (holding that seniority-based appointments to a higher paying position included in a
collective bargaining agreement do not fall under the authority of the Act).
55. See Brickhouse v. Spring Ford Sch. Dist., 656 A.2d 483 (Pa. 1995). In Brickhouse,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a veteran does not enjoy an automatic
appointment preference to a public position when he merely meets the minimum
qualifications of a position; instead, the employer is entitled to demand higher-level, but
reasonable, qualifications. Id. at 490.
56. Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 701, 702-03 (Pa. 1938). Chief Justice Kephart wrote the
opinion for a unanimous court that included Justices Barnes, Drew, Linn, Maxey, and
Schaffer. As a third class city, Erie administered its employment practices in accordance
with the Third Class City Law, June 23, 1931, Pub. L No. 932. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 702. Section
4405 of the Third Class City Law required Erie to apply the fifteen percent bonus to veteran's
scores prior to considering the examination's results, and section 4407 mandated selection of
a veteran when that veteran's examination score placed among the top four highest scores.
Third Class City Law, June 23, 1931. Pub. L. No. 932.
57. Schmid, 3 A2d at 703 n.1.
58. Id. Applicants for Erie assistant building inspector positions were required to
demonstrate their qualifications by passing an examination; appointments to the positions
resulted from a selection of one of the top four scoring candidates. Id.
59. Id. at 703. The Article Ill provision regarding privileges and immunities was
removed from the Pennsylvania Constitution during its 1967 revision. The repealed Article
I1, section 7 proscribed "any local or special law . . . granting to any corporation,
association, or individual any special privilege or immunity ... " Id. at 704.
60. Id. at 704.
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long as the practice of preferring veterans is reasonably related to
the goal of enabling good government, the court declared the policy
constitutionally sound.
61
Applying the reasonable relationship test 2 to the two provisions
in question, an opinion written by Chief Justice Kephart for a
unanimous court produced dual results. First, the court concluded
that a veteran's demonstrated discipline, experience, service,
loyalty, and public spirit are traits directly related to good
government service.6 Mandatory appointment of veterans, the court
noted, is a reasonable appraisal of the worth of these traits.6
The Schmid court did not uphold the fifteen percent bonus
provision, its reasoning mirroring other states' treatment of
veterans' preference: veterans must qualify for a public job before
being preferred for it.6 Public employees qualify through an
examination process - the fifteen percent pre-scoring Bonus could
change a failing score to a passing one - the court concluded the
Bonus could result in the appointment of an unqualified
candidate.6 The court held that allowing an unqualified job
candidate to assume a position that requires demonstrated
qualifications artificially credits military experience, creating a
constitutionally repugnant special and exclusive privilege.
67
The issue in O'Neill concerned the constitutionality of the
Veterans' Preference Act's provision awarding the Bonus to
veterans who successfully completed a civil service promotional
examination.6 George Braden, a non-veteran, passed the 1949
61. Id.
62. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
63. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 705. See Matter of Keymer, 42 N.E. 667 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1896) (preference to
veterans does not exempt veterans from participating in the examination process); Opinion
of the Justices, 44 N.E. 625 (Mass. 1896) (non-mandatory veterans' preference for positions
without examinations is valid); Cook v. Mason, 283 P. 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929) (holding that
lowering veterans' examination passing mark by five points was improper); State v.
McDonald, 246 N.W. 900 (Minn. 1933) (an act lowering veterans' examination passing mark is
invalid).
66. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 707.
67. Id. The current Third Class City Act employs language consistent with Schmid:
"When the examination of any such person is compiled and graded, and if the mark is
passing, then such grading or percentage as the examination merits shall be increased by
fifteen per centum." 53 PA CON. STAT. § 39405 (1951).
68. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951). Chief Justice Drew, joined by Justices
Bell, Chidsey, and Jones, wrote the opinion of the court. Justice Steame, joined by Justices
Ladner and Stem, dissented vigorously, finding no distinction between an appointment and a
promotion, disagreeing with the majority that non-veterans almost always become the
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Philadelphia Fire Bureau Captain promotion examination, but
despite scoring higher than several veterans, was ranked lower on
the eligibility list than Bonus-augmented veterans.69 Using the
successful Schmid reasoning, Braden argued that the promotional
Bonus was unconstitutional class legislation.70
The supreme court concluded that the Schmid test validated
Braden's claim v.7 The court distinguished an "appointment" from a
"promotion," affirming that military-developed traits positively
impact an appointee's performance of governmental duties.72
Benefit, however, does not extend to promotional positions for, as
the court reasoned, after time, the non-veteran develops abilities
equal to the veteran's.7 3 Consequently, because the Bonus placed
too great an emphasis on the value of military experience relative
to a promotional position (i.e., it was not reasonably related to
employing a more able public servant), the court struck down the
promotional Bonus as "unreasonable and class legislation and
therefore unconstitutional."
74
While it has formulated and employed the test to determine the
constitutionality of veterans' preference, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has yet to rule on the issue of what type of military
service invokes the Act. The commonwealth court addressed this
matter on at least two occasions: Herskovitz v. State Civil Serv.
Comm'n75 and Pontious v. Rippy.7 6
veterans' equals, and concluding that the matter falls within the province of the legislature.
Id. at 385-86 (Stearne, J., dissenting). The statute in question was the Veterans' Preference
Act of May 22, 1945, Pub. L No. 837, as amended. O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 385-86 (Stearne, J.,
dissenting).
69. O'Nei/l, 83 A.2d at 382. The ten-point promotion Bonus is distinguishable from the
fifteen-point Schmid bonus because while the 1945 Veterans' Preference Act in O'Neill
required the veteran to pass the examination to receive the Bonus, in Schmid, the Bonus
was awarded even when a veteran did not achieve a passing mark. Id. Further, O'Nei
concerned a promotional bonus while Schmid concerned an original appointment bonus, a
preference the O'Neill court conceded was constitutional. Id. at 382-83.
70. Id. "Class legislation" is a law that confers benefits on an arbitrarily selected group.
BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 249 (6th ed. 1991).
71. Id. at 384. Chief Justice Drew was a member of the unanimous Schmid court. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 373.
73. O'Neill, 83 A_2d at 373.
74. Id. In its 1975 reenactment of the Veterans' Preference Act, 51 PA. CON. STAT.
§ 7101-09 (1975), the legislature included identical promotional bonus language as that at
issue in O'Neill. In a later action, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again held the
promotional bonus to be arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional. Hoffman v. Township of
Whitehall, 677 A2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. 1996).
75. Herskovitz v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 534 A-2d 160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987). Judge
MacPhail wrote the opinion for the majority, in which Colins and Craig, JJ., participated.
682 Duquesne Law Review Vol. '36:671
Herskovitz involved three candidates - Richard Herskovitz,
Louis Cocheres, and Albert Strohecker, (collectively "Petitioners")
- who applied for appointments as administrative law judges with
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, positions that fall
under the State Civil Service Commission ("State Commission")
selection procedures.77 Each petitioner had enlisted in either the
Reserves or National Guard, completed the associated active duty
training, and completed the part-time service obligation prior to the
State's recruitment. 78 The State Commission interpreted the Act as
awarding veterans' preference only to soldier candidates who
performed full-time military duty; thus, the State Commission
refused to award veterans' preference to the petitioners.
79
The commonwealth court reversed the State Commission's
decision by extending the definition of "armed forces of the United
States" to include the Reserves.80 This extension resulted from a
two-part analysis: (1) whether awarding the preference to
Reservists and National Guard members is consistent with the Act's
intent, and (2) whether part-time military service is consistent with
the military service contemplated by the Act.8'
The Herskovitz court analyzed the Act's intent by applying
section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act: a law's purpose
is a direct function of the legislature's intent as gleaned from the
law's plain wording in all of its provisions.82 The court found what
Crumlish, P.J., wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Palladino, J., joined. See supra notes
22-28.
76. Pontious v. Rippy, 589 A.2d 1188 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). Silvestri, S.J., wrote the
opinion of the court, in which Kelley, J., joined. Doyle, J., filed a concurring opinion.
77. Herskovitz, 534 A.2d at 160. The State Civil Service Commission oversees
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania employment practices, which are governed by the Civil
Service Act, 71 Pa Cons. Stat. §§ 741.1 -741.1005 (1941).
78. Herskovitz, 534 A-2d at 160, 161. After receiving an honorable discharge from his
full Reserve commitment, Strohecker enlisted in the National Guard and was a Guard
member at the time of the litigation. Id. at 161.
79. Id. at 161. Although both Herskovitz and Sicuro focus on Reserve members, their
issues differ Herskovitz concerned Reservists' preclusion from veterans' preference awards,
while Sicuro, admitting Reservists' eligibility, concerned the time at which the preference is
awarded.
80. Herskovitz, 534 A.2d at 163.
81. Id. at 161-62. The court also examined the State Commission's argument that 51 Pa.
Con. Stat. section 103 required it to conform to federal veteran policies. Id. at 162. The
Commission asserted that because federal veterans' preference is limited to those who serve
at least 181 consecutive post-training active duty days, compliance with section 103 required
it to deny Herskovitz the ten-point bonus. Id. The court rejected this argument, citing the
exclusivity-in-preference provision of 51 Pa. Con. Stat. section 7109 and 51 Pa. Con. Stat.
section 103's intent of uniformity in non-preference matters. Id. at 162-63.
82. Id. at 161. The Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. Con. Stat. section 1921 (1975),
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it termed "a clear statement of legislative intent" in the Act's
section 7102(a), which listed "discipline and experience represented
by his military training and for the loyalty and public spirit
demonstrated by his service for the preservation of his country" as
the legislature's reasons for applying the Bonus. 3 Believing that
these reasons describe part-time Reservists as much as full-time
soldiers, the court concluded that the legislature intended the Act
to reach Reservists. 4 Additionally, the court found intent to reach
the Reservists in the Act's lack of language limiting the preference
to full-time soldiers and in its clear language covering "a person
. . . who served or hereafter serves in the armed forces of the
United States . . . since July 27, 19 53. "85
In its second analysis of whether Herskovitz' level of military
service was consistent with the Act's idea of military service, the
court reviewed the nature of the Reserves.86 The Act awards
preference to those who served in the United States armed forces
or any associated women's organization and holds an honorable
discharge from such service.87 Although the Act mentions neither
the Reserves nor the National Guard specifically, the court
concluded that both branches are so federal in nature as to be
included within the -United States armed forces - as evidenced by
reads as follows:
§ 1921. Legislative intent control.
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity the letter
of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the General
Assembly, may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
The occasion and necessity for the statute.
The circumstances under which it was enacted.
The mischief to be remedied.
The object to be obtained.
The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar
subjects.
The consequences of the particular interpretation.
The contemporaneous legislative history.
Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
1 PA- CON. STAT. § 1921 (1975).
83. Herskovitz, 534 A.2d at 161.
84. Id. The court noted that "continuous service" distinguished between part-time and
full-time military service but characterized the disruptions as similar. Id.
85. Id. (quoting 51 PA. CON. STAT. § 7101 (1975)).
86. Herskovitz, 534 A.2d at 162.
87. 51 PA- CON. STAT. § 7101 (1975).
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their members' federal institution training, potential overseas duty
and involvement in the "United States Total Force Policy."88 Now
included in the definition of "armed forces," the petitioners were
entitled to the preference as a result of their active training and
service in the Reserve or National Guard.89 The commonwealth
court further defined eligibility for veterans' preference in Pontious
v. Rippy, a case concerning whether the preference may be
awarded only to those who served during a time of armed
conflict 0 Pontious served in the United States Marine Corps from
1974 until he was honorably discharged in 1977.91 He passed the
Johnsonburg Borough police officer examinations in 1985 and in
1987, but despite being each eligibility list's sole veteran, was
bypassed for appointment by the borough council.92 Citing the Act's
mandatory appointment provision, he brought an action in
mandamus to compel his appointment.93 The borough contended
that it properly denied the preference because it interpreted the
Act to apply only to veterans who served during a time of armed
conflict and Pontious' service did not coincide with such a time.94
The commonwealth court ruled against the borough, finding the
restrictive interpretation conflicted with the plain meaning of the
Act: a soldier eligible for the preference is one who served in
88. Herskovitz, 534 A.2d at 162. See Insurance Fed'n of Pa. v. Foster, 587 A.2d 865 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (citing Consumers Educ. and Protective Ass'n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675 (Pa
1977) for the proposition that legislative omission does not automatically exclude a matter
from an Act's intent).
89. Id. at 163.
90. Pontious, 589 A.2d at 1189.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. "Mandamus" is an order issued by a superior court that commands a
governmental entity to discharge its duty. BLAcK's LAw DIcnoNARY 961 (6th ed. 1990).
Pontious' authority for the mandatory selection was 51 PA. CON. STAT. § 7104(b):
Whenever any soldier possesses the requisite qualifications, and his name appears on
any eligible . . . list, certified . . . as a result of any such civil service examination,
the appointing . . . power in making an appointment . . . to a public position shall
give preference to such soldier, notwithstanding, that his name does not stand highest
on the eligibility . . . list.
51 PA- CON. STAT. § 7104(b) (1975). The mandatory preference provision was not directly at
issue in Sicuro.
94. Pontious, 589 A.2d at 1189. In ruling for the borough, the trial court held that
veterans' preference was not available to soldiers who did not serve during a time of armed
conflict. Id. This ruling prompted Pontious to assert that his military service, begun in 1974,
coincided with the end of the Vietnam War, a time of armed conflict. Id. The trial court,
however, ruled that the Vietnam War concluded on January 28, 1973, the date of the Paris
Peace Accord signing. Id. Pontious raised this issue in the commonwealth court, whose
holding precluded the need to rule on this matter. Id. at 1191 n.5.
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armed conflict "or hereafter serves in the armed forces of the
United States . . . since July 27, 1953 . .. and who has an
honorable discharge from such service."95 The court ordered the
borough to appoint Pontious to a position as a Johnsonburg police
officer because Pontious honorably served after July 27, 1953.96
Pontious is equally pertinent for Judge Doyle's concurrence, in
which he fully agreed with the court's reasoning but warned of its
ramifications. 97 Questioning whether the legislature intended such a
result, Judge Doyle foresaw a marked expansion in the application
of veterans' preference, characterizing the decision as mandating
preference to honorably discharged soldiers regardless of the
brevity of their service.
98
The Sicuro decision has clarified a confused area of
Pennsylvania law. Prior to its publication, public employers could
rely on only one appellate level decision, Herskovitz, as they
wrestled with Reservists' inclusion in the Act, and a fair Herskovitz
conclusion runs counter to the Sicuro holding.
Although it was not specifically asked to decide whether the
Act's Bonus provision reaches currently-committed Reservists, the
Herskovitz court on three occasions indicated a positive direction.
In characterizing Reservists' military-provided discipline and
experience as equal to that of full-time soldiers, the court employed
present tense to describe the Reservists' military service.9 The
court also wrote in present tense when it defined a "soldier" as one
who "served or is serving," labeling such as the Act's clear
language.1°° In both cases, the former discussing the Act's intent
95. Id. at 1190 (citing 51 PA CON. STAT. § 7101 (1975)). The term "soldier," as
representing one eligible for veterans' preference, was originally made part of the Act of May
22, 1945, Pub. L No. 837, but it did not refer to one who "hereafter serves" until the
amended Act of January 25, 1966, Pub. L No. 1545. Pontious, 589 A.2d at 1190.
96. Pontious, 589 A.2d at 1190. The court also ordered a separate hearing to determine
compensatory damages. Id. at 1191. The court awarded Pontious the police officer position
because the borough had wrongfully appointed another, had the borough not appointed
anyone during his term of eligibility, Pontious would have had no right to an appointment
See Yuska v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 514 A-2d 297 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
97. Pontious, 589 A.2d at 1191 (Doyle, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. Herskovitz, 534 A.2d at 161. The court stated, "We also believe that one who serves
in the Pennsylvania National Guard or in the U.S. Army Reserve receives the same discipline
and experience of military training as those engaged in full-time active service and that the
Guard or Reserve voluntary enlistments demonstrate the same public spirited service.. 
Id.
100. Id. at 162. The court stated, "[T]he clear language of the statute is that a soldier
includes any person who served or is serving in the armed forces of the Unites States." Id.
The Act, however, never employs "is serving;" the actual language is "served or hereafter
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and the latter construing the act's language, the court appears to
address current Reservists. These statements, together with the
court's equation of active-duty Reserve training with active military
service, led a number of public employers to expand the definition
of "soldier" to include a currently-obligated Reservist.' 10
The Sicuro court precluded obligated Reservists from veterans'
preference, thereby dispelling any confusion relative to their rights
under the Act.'02 Unlike Herskovitz, the court directly addressed
non-separated Reservists with three propositions: (1) Reserve
active-duty training alone does not satisfy the type of military
service the Act contemplates, (2) Reservists gain Bonus eligibility
upon concluding their full military obligation, and (3) Reservists
must be "soldiers" at or before a qualifying examination in order to
enjoy the benefit of the Bonus.' °3
A determination of whether Sicuro properly resolved Reservists'
Bonus eligibility requires analysis by the standard veterans'
preference proof: the Schmid test.1°4 The Schmid test validates the
Bonus if the basis of the preference (status as a veteran) is
reasonably related to the goal (able execution of public duties). 1°5
Applying Schmid to Sicuro, obligated Reservists are Bonus eligible
only if their training time (the point at which they were honorably
discharged) results in the "discipline," "experience," "loyalty," and
"public spirit" the Act seeks to reward. °6
It appears clear that Reserve active-duty training does not satisfy
the Act's intent. The legislature designed the Act to reward soldiers
for their national service, to compensate them for delaying
professional pursuits, and to take advantage of military-provided
training and experience. 07 Soldiers satisfy each of these three
serves." 51 PA. CON. STAT. § 7101 (1975).
101. After Herskovitz, but prior to Sicuro, the Commonwealth concluded that
"currently-committed Reservists" are "soldiers" when they are honorably discharged from
active duty training and are awarded the Bonus accordingly. See Pennsylvania Dept. of
Community Affairs, Model Rules and Regulations for a Municipal Civil Service Commission
(1992) (currently-committed Reservists who earned honorable discharges from Reserve
training are eligible for the Bonus). Appellants Brief at Exhibit 1. See also Governor's Office
Management Directive, No. 580.21, 1992 (currently-committed Reservists who have been
honorably discharged from active duty training are eligible for veterans' preference in state
civil service positions) Appellant's Brief at Exhibit 2.
102. Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 236-37.
103. Id.
104. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704. See Sicuro, 684 A.2d at 237; O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 383;
Brickhouse, 656 A2d at 486; Hoffman, 677 A.2d at 1202.
105. Brickhouse, 656 A2d at 486.
106. 51 PA. CON. STAT. § 7102 (1975). See Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704.
107. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 11.
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factors by completing a substanital period of service - the three to
four months required for a Reservist training discharge is not
substantial and hence does not achieve any of the legislature's
goals. As stated by the Sicuro trial court, Reservists "have not
made any contribution of service that would justify a veterans'
preference; they have simply gained the training necessary for them
to begin to make a contribution."' °8 The Statutory Construction
Act's analysis validates this conclusion. When ambiguous language
or multiple interpretations (such as whether "honorable discharge"
includes separation from Reserve training) cloud an act's intent, the
Statutory Construction Act charges courts with distilling the
legislature's statutory design.'10 The judicial analysis includes review
of the act's goal, a presumption against absurd results, and a
preference to public over private interests."0 Had it held differently,
the Sicuro court would have rewarded job applicants who offered
the same skills as their competitors who never enlisted in the
military. Granting preference without gaining return is unreasonable
because it only works to the private advantage of current
Reservists for their acts. of enlistment without regard to any
advantages to the public employer.1 ' The Schmid court warned
against attaching unwarranted value to military service."12 The
Sicuro court heeded this warning by ruling that advantages
associated with military skills and experience, as well as rewards




109. Pennsylvania Fin. Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 664 A.2d 84, 87
(Pa. 1995).
110. Id.
111. The trial court judge viewed the greatest concern as the elimination of any
meaningful veterans' preference because the City's practice focused the preference on
military enlistment, not on the traits gained and service completed as contemplated by the
Act. Sicuro, No. GD 95-12924 at 19.
112. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704.
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